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WEAPONS TO F IGHT INSIDER T RADING
“Fault should be a requirement for punishment.”
Benjamin N. Cardozo 1
WEAPONS TO F IGHT INSIDER TRADING IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
A CALL FOR THE REPEAL OF SECTION 16(B)2
by
Michael H. Dessent*

Does it make legal sense that a corporate officer who bought and sold
shares in his own company within a six-month period at an accounting loss, with
no intent to deceive, can be sued to give up her nonexistent “profits”? Should
the so-called aggrieved plaintiff be entitled to recover if he was not even a
shareholder at the time of the defendant’s stock trades and had never even
heard of the corporation until his lawyer told him to buy that stock?3 Should a
judgment for that plaintiff be allowed if he purchased only one share of stock in
that corporation just before filing suit? What if he is seeking only a negligible
1

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). Then Chief
Judge Cardozo (later U.S. Supreme Court Justice), explained the position of the
prestigious New York Court of Appeals in the context that criminal statutes should
require some knowledge that a criminal act was morally wrong:
In the light of all these precedents, it is impossible . . . to say that
there is any decisive adjudication which limits the word “wrong” in the
statutory definition to legal as opposed to moral wrong. The trend of
the decisions is indeed the other way. The utmost that can be said
is that the question is still an open one. We must, therefore, give
that construction to the statute which seems to us most consonant
with reason and justice.
People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 338 (1915).
2
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994) [hereinafter
Section 16(b)].
*
Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. The author
wishes to thank Sunny Nassim and Mary-Ellen Norvell for their excellent assistance
with this article.
3
A case illustrating this principle is Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
In this decision the defendant was ordered to pay $300,000 to the corporation
for the "profits" he earned over several six-month periods. Id. at 52. In actuality he
had incurred a taxable loss of $400,000. The court followed Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,
136 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1943), which stated that to give section 16(b) its full effect,
the calculation would be the shares with the lowest purchase price, matched against
those with the highest sale prices. Id. at 237 & n.11. Thus, they would ignore any
losses which may be actualized. Id. at 238.
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share of the recovery himself, while his attorney in the action can receive
several thousand dollars?4
Finally, is it legally “right”5 that over 66 years of comprehensive
securities litigation involving Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,6 and its Rule 10(b)5,7 have led to well-defined standards of such unique
concepts of “duty,” “breach,” “ scienter,” “ causation,”
“reliance,”
“misappropriation” and “materiality” for insider trading,8 but none of that
matters in a § 16(b) case?
It is the position of this paper that § 16(b)9 needs to be repealed. That
statute puts blame on innocent people and essentially legalizes champerty.10
Adequate standards have been created by which culpability for insider trading
can be determined and society protected.11 Equally important, the high
likelihood of champerty, and the total lack of merit and standing of most
individual plaintiffs, coupled with the Supreme Court’s recent U.S. v. O’Hagan12
decision, give Congress a marvelous opportunity to repeal the statute while still
carrying out its original legislative purpose.13
Sections I and II of this paper consist of an examination of Section 16(b)
and the intent of Congress in establishing this section. It further discusses the
policy behind Congress’ allowance of non-owners of the security at the time of
the “short swing” transaction to establish standing to sue by acquiring the
4

Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 846-47 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 972 (1956).
5
For judicial definitions of that word in a criminal context, see Tenement House Dept.
v. McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 163 (1915); People on Inf. of Price v. Sheffield FarmsSlawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25 (1918).
6
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
7
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
8
For the most recent U.S. Supreme Court decision discussing these terms, see
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
9
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
10
“A bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by which the stranger
pursues the party’s claim in consideration of receiving part of any judgment proceeds.”
NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, P ROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE
PROFESSION 273 (1996). Also relates to general term of “maintenance”- “maintaining,
supporting, or promoting the litigation of another.” See also BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY
157 (6th ed. 1991).
11
See generally United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
12
Id.
13
The U.S. Supreme Court has continuously struggled over the propriety of strict
liability in criminal law. See e.g., United States v. Parks, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
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security even after the alleged transaction has taken place.
Sections III through VI discuss the abuses by attorneys in making large
profits in connection with Section 16(b) cases. In this section it will be shown
that the practice of receiving such large attorney’s fees is actually longstanding. Gollust v. Mendell14 is the most recent case addressing this issue.
However, there is a history of cases which date back as early as the 1940s.
This section will also consider the issues of contingent fee agreements and
champerty and how these compensation practices may facilitate the self
interest of attorneys who initiate Section 16(b) suits. Lastly, this section will
deal with the issues of solicitation and whether attorneys who find someone to
purchase the security of the “issuer” (such as friends or family) for the sole
purpose of initiating a law suit are acting ethically.
Section VII discusses possible solutions to the problems associated with
Section 16(b) actions, including other alternatives to the problems associated
with instituting a Section 16(b) suit. One such solution may be to amend
Section 16(b) to permit, as plaintiffs, only those who are shareholders at the
time of the alleged trade. In the alternative, the United States v. O’Hagan
decision,15 may offer a solution, thereby determining that there may no longer
be a need for Section 16(b). It concludes with a focus on a contemporary view
of the intent and purpose of Section 16(b), and discusses what measures could
be taken to cure the ongoing problems associated with this Section.
I. THE F ACTUAL SETTING
Imagine two different hypotheticals which might occur in today's stock
markets. In the first, a corporate officer in a publicly traded corporation obtains
confidential, non-disclosed material information regarding an upcoming merger
of his business. He decides that this would be the perfect opportunity to make
a sizable profit by purchasing stock in his company, the price of which he
knows is likely to soar when news of the proposed merger is disclosed
publicly.16 The officer purchases the stock. A few weeks later, an appropriate
14

501 U.S. 115 (1991), aff’g 909 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1990).
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
16
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 202.05 202.06 (The
Exchange 1992).
202.05 Timely Disclosure of Material News Developments
A listed company is expected to release quickly to the public any news or
information which it might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for
its securities. This is one of the most important and fundamental purposes of the
listing agreement which the company enters into with the Exchange.
A listed company should also act promptly to dispel unfounded rumors which
result in unusual market activity or price variations.
15
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202.06 Procedure for Public Release of Information
(A) Immediate Release Policy
The normal method of publication of important corporate data is by means of a
press release. This may be either by telephone or in written form. Any release of
information that could reasonably be expected to have an impact on the market for a
company’s securities should be given to the wire services and the press For
Immediate Release. . . .
(B)
Telephone Alert to the Exchange
When the announcement of news of a material event or a statement dealing
with a rumor which calls for immediate release is made shortly before the opening or
during market hours (presently 9:30 A.M. to 5.00 P.M., New York time), it is
recommended that the company’s Exchange representative be notified by telephone at
least ten minutes prior to release of the announcement to the news media. If the
Exchange receives such notification in time, it will be in a position to consider
whether, in the opinion of the Exchange, trading in the security should be temporarily
halted. A delay in trading after the appearance of the news on the Dow Jones or
Reuters news wires provides a period of calm for public evaluation of the
announcement. . . . A longer delay in trading may be necessary if there is an unusual
influx of orders. The Exchange attempts to keep such interruptions in the continuous
auction market to a minimum. However, where events transpire during market hours,
the overall importance of fairness to all those participating in the market demands that
these procedures be followed.
(C)
Release to Newspapers and News Wire Services
News which ought to be the subject of immediate publicity must be released
by the fastest available means. The fastest available means may vary in individual
cases and according to the time of day. Ordinarily, this requires a release to the
public press by telephone, telegraph, or hand delivery, or some combination of such
methods. Transmittal of such a release to the press solely by mail is not considered
satisfactory. Similarly, release of such news exclusively to the local press outside of
New York City would not be sufficient for adequate and prompt disclosure to the
investing public.
To insure adequate coverage, releases requiring immediate publicity should be
given to Dow Jones & Company, Inc., and to Reuters Economic Services.
Companies are also encouraged to promptly distribute their releases to
Associated Press and United Press International as well as to newspapers in New
York City and in cities where the company is headquartered or has plants or other
major facilities. . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
In 1970, the SEC issued a general release relating to the disclosure of material
corporate developments. See SEC comment on Timely Disclosure of Material
Corporate Developments, Securities Act Release No. 5092, Exchange Act Release
No. 8995, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,915, at 80,035 (Oct. 15, 1970). See also
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (3d ed., 1996) (citing
ROBERT SOBEL, N.Y.S.E.: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 1935-1975
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formal announcement about the upcoming merger is made. As anticipated by
the officer, the corporation's stock price doubles quickly. The officer then sells
his newly acquired stock for a multi-million dollar profit.
In the second hypothetical, a corporate officer, also in a publicly traded
corporation, buys 1000 shares of stock in her company to help fund her child's
education. She purchases that stock for $100.00 per share. Five months
later, she is compelled to sell these shares to meet a medical emergency for
the child. Fortunately, during those five months, the price per share for the
corporation's stock has increased from $100.00 to $175.00 per share. While
the officer possessed knowledge of material, non-public information, she did
not base her decision to purchase or sell on that news.
When comparing these situations, it seems appropriate that the officer
in the first example should be subject to discipline because he was engaging in
insider trading, using material, inside information for his own personal gain.17
In the second example, the officer was the beneficiary of a strong market, but
never used her position in the corporation to aid her in personally gaining from
the sale of the stock. Equitably, it does not seem appropriate to punish the
latter just because she had some good fortune. Unfortunately for both parties,
Section 16(b) holds them both liable for all “profits” realized in the transactions.
In fact, as is discussed later, the defendant in the latter case can be found
liable for much more monetary damages than her actual taxable profits, unlike
defendants with criminal intent in Section 10(b) cases.18
II. THE POLITICAL SETTING
In 1934, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,19 to
deal with issues relating to the sale and purchase of securities. Section 10(b)
of that Act provided, quite simply:
[It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
(1975) and Dennis S. Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure and the National Markets in
the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1473 (1986)).
17
See e.g., S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The officer also has Williams Act and mail fraud
liability as well. See e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Piper
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997).
18

See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).

19

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (West 1997).
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of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange . . . (b) to use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
However, with no definition of terms or official guidelines as to its use, §
10(b) was little used for a decade. Then Milton Freeman, who created it,
speaking in 1967 at a conference on the codification of the Federal Securities
Laws with Sumner Pike and the recently deceased Louis Loss on the panel,
said:
I think it would be appropriate for me now to make a
brief statement of what actually happened when 10b-5 was
adopted, where it would be written down and be available to
everybody, not just the people who are willing to listen to me.
It was one day in the year 1943, 1 believe. I was sitting
in my office in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received
a call from Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the
Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been on
the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C.
Regional Administrator in Boston, "and he has told me about
the president of some company in Boston who is going around
buying up the stock of his company from his own shareholders
at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the
company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are
going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for the
coming year. Is there anything we can do about it?" So he
came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at
Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them
together, and the only discussion we had there was where "in
connection with the purchase or sale” should be, and we
decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar,
and I don't remember whether we got there that morning or
after lunch. We passed a piece of paper around to all the
commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they
tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said
anything except Sumner Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are
against fraud, aren't we?" That is how it happened.
Louis is absolutely right that I never thought that
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twenty-odd years later it would be the biggest thing that had
ever happened. It was intended to give the Commission power
to deal with this problem. It had no relation in the Commission's
contemplation to private proceedings. Milton Freeman,
Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. Law 793, 922 (1967).
Contrariwise, Section § 16(b) was specifically written as a strict liability
statute intended “to prevent the abuse of the use of inside information by
officers, directors, and more than 10% shareholders.”20 The legislature history
of this section reveals that Congress intended it to be the main provision to
stop insider trading.21
Just one year after the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933,22 which
regulated the initial issuance of securities, Congress became alarmed by
certain types of stock trading by officers and directors of public corporations.23
It concluded that there was a need to restore the integrity of the stock market
in order to encourage participation by the general public.24 Ordinary people

20

In Freedman v. Barrow, a federal court stated that by enacting the “short swing”
profits provision of this section, Congress recognized that short swing speculation by
large stockholders, officer and directors, all of whom might have access to inside
information, would threaten the goal of section 16(b) “to insure the maintenance of fair
and honest markets,” 427 F. Supp. 1129, 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In Wagman v. Astle,
the federal court stated that the purpose of Section 16(b) was to restore eroded
investor confidence in the integrity of the stock market. 380 F. Supp. 497, 501
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). The Court expressed the rationale that “it is unfair for some to profit
in ways that others cannot.” Id.
21

See Wagman, 380 F. Supp. at 501.

22

Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994).

23

See Susan A. Wetzel, Comment, New Rule 16b-3, the SEC’s Attempt to Aid
Insiders by Revising Rule 16b is Much Ado About Nothing, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 125,
128 (1998).
24

Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, stated that the policy behind the creation of
Securities Exchange Act was to "insure a fair and honest market, that is, one which
would reflect an evaluation of securities in light of all available and pertinent data." 136
F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1943). The court reviewed the background of the section and
determined that “speculation by insiders, officers, directors and principal shareholders
was a widely condemned evil,” according to the Hearings before Committee on
Banking and Currency. Id. See also Hearings before Committee on Banking and
Currency on S. 84, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., and S. 56 and S. 97, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess., 1934. The court concluded that the only solution which the framers deemed
effective for this action was “the imposition of liability based upon an objective measure

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 4, Art. 1

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:4

who bought and sold shares were being disadvantaged by the fact that
“insiders”25 were in a position to find out valuable information concerning their
own company’s stock before it was known to the public and use this information
to make a profit. Having defined such public policy, Congress took the step of
imposing strict liability upon those officers, directors and ten percent
shareholders who transacted certain “short” sales of the issuer’s securities.26
The end result Congress desired was the elimination of the unfair practice
known as “insider trading.”27
III. AN OVERVIEW OF T HE ISSUES
While the intent of Congress was the restoration in the faith and
integrity of the stock market, the following issues soon arose in conjunction with
the new Section 16(b). Many of these stemmed from the language used in the

of proof.” Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 235.
The court cited Mr. Corcoran's testimony, a chief spokesman for the draftsmen and
proponents of the Act, wherein he stated, "You hold the director, irrespective of any
intention or expectation to sell the security within six months after, because it will be
absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you
have to have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of
having to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short
swing.” Id. The court confirmed its position by noting that had Congress intended that
only profits made by the misuse of inside information would be recoverable, it would
have said so. Id. at 236. Therefore, because Congress did not limit the recovery to
profits gained by the misuse of information, neither would the Court. See Id. at 237.
25

Initially defined as officers, directors, and those owning over 10 per centum of a
corporation’s stock. 15 U.S.C. §78p(a) (1994).
26

See Ellen Taylor, Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: Rethinking Section 16, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (1997).
27

Wetzel, supra note 23, at 127 & n.14, noting that a 1915 New York Times survey
showed that 90% of business executives interviewed admitted to trading regularly in
their own corporation shares. See also HENRY G. MANNE , INSIDER TRADING AND THE
STOCK MARKET 2 (1966). However, there is some contrary belief as to the actual
intention of Section 16(b). See generally Karl Shumpei Okamoto, Rereading Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 27 GA. L. REV. 183 (1992) (proposing that
Section 16(b) was actually intended to prevent market manipulation, because insiders
have the ability to artificially move stock prices by trading on their privileged
information); Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of
Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391 (1991) (stating that the Act’s purpose
was to discourage manipulation of corporate affairs to create opportunities to trade
corporate stock profitably, since insiders generally invest for the long term).
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section and others from the interpretations which courts made when defining
it.28
Section 16(b) entitles the issuer, or a security holder bringing suit on
the issuer’s behalf, to recover short swing profits realized from the purchase
and sale by a subject insider of such issuer’s equity securities within a sixmonth period.29 Basically, it prohibits insiders from making a profit on
transactions in their company’s securities when the purchase and sale of the
securities both occurred within a six-month period. Section 16(b) is controlled
by an irrefutable presumption that the profits gained by the insider were
produced unfairly. Therefore, insiders must disgorge any profits realized in this
type of short swing transaction and return the profit to the company. This
disgorgement controls irrespective of the purchasers actual intent.30
Section 16(c) prevents insiders from profiting from downturns in the
price of their corporation’s securities by prohibiting short sales “against the
box.” In a short sale, the seller does not actually own the stock. Instead, the
seller borrows stock, generally from his or her broker, and sells it in the market.
The seller must at some later time replace the borrowed securities by
purchasing replacement securities in the market. The seller engages in short
selling in the hope that the market price will decline because the replacement
securities may be purchased at a lower price than those initially sold (the
borrowed securities), thus creating a profit. Section 16(d) and Section 16(e)
exempt certain transactions from the overall coverage of Section 16.31
28

Section 16 has two primary subsections which set out its requirements and 3
additional ones which limit the Section’s overall scope. Section 16(a) places
requirements on certain statutorily defined insiders to report to the SEC their beneficial
stock interests. Section 16(a) defines those insiders which are subject to the
requirements as “every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 10 per centum of any class of an equity security (other than an exempted
security) which is registered pursuant to section 78(1) of this title (section 12 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934), or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of
such security.” Pursuant to Section 16(a), these defined insiders must file an initial
report when their company’s securities are registered under Section 12 or within 10
days after becoming statutory insiders. Following the initial report, insiders must file
transaction reports by the tenth day of the month following any month in which there
has been a substantial change in their ownership, and they must also file annual
statements of beneficial ownership with the SEC. See generally, Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
29

15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1994).

30

See id.

31

Id. §§ 78p(d), 78p(e).
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A. Standing
One particular issue was the fact that a person suing to disgorge a
“short swing” transaction did not have to be a shareholder at the time that the
alleged illegal transaction took place.32 The only step the plaintiff had to take
in order to obtain standing was to be an “owner of [a] security” of the “issuer”
when he filed the complaint.33 He did not even have to be a shareholder at the
time of the trade.34
Section 16(b) thus still makes it easy for a party to bring an action
against an insider who has violated Section 16(b) for five distinct reasons.
Specifically, Section 16(b) provides that a plaintiff in a Section 16(b) suit must
be the owner of a “security” of the issue corporation.35 A “security” for
purposes of Section 16(b) includes warrants, convertible debentures, bonds,
puts, calls, and a variety of other financial instruments.36 This expansive
determination of what a “security” entails for purposes of Section 16(b)
increases the chances of a party having a means to achieve standing to bring
a suit against an insider.
Second, the plaintiff can be either the “record” or “beneficial” owner of
a subject security.37 This point confers standing on a wide array of potential
plaintiffs. Then, the plaintiff need only own the security at the time he institutes
the suit against the insider, not at the time of the purchase and sale by the
insider.38
32

See id. § 78p(b).

33

Id. See generally Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Landsdale, Jr., The Judicial and
Regulatory Construction of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33, 38-55 (1992).
34

See 15 U.S.C. § 78 p(b) (1994).

35

Id.

36

See generally S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); see also Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994).
37

See generally Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967). See
also 15 U.S.C. §78m(d) (1994). See also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 709 (3d ed., 1996) (stating that “nowhere in Exchange Act is the concept
of beneficial ownership explicitly defined and therefore its scope has been limited to
judicial interpretation and administrative rulemaking.”).
38

See Dottenheim v. Murchison, 227 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 919, (1957); see also Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1954), cert.
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Moreover, there are no restrictions in terms of either the number or
percentage of shares or the value of such securities that must be held by the
plaintiff.39 This plaintiff could purchase one share of stock, allege that there is
a Section 16(b) violation, and properly bring a suit. Finally, case law makes it
even easier by granting attorneys’ fees to attorneys who represent successful
plaintiffs, thus eliminating the cost of litigation for the plaintiff.40
B. Champerty and its Residue
Other key issues concerning this statute are the use of contingent fees,
champerty and solicitation. A contingent fee is “a charge made by an attorney
dependent upon a successful outcome in the case and is often agreed to be a
percentage of the party’s recovery.”41 Champerty is an agreement between an
attorney and his client in which the attorney is essentially the real party in
interest in the client’s suit and pays the costs in return for a large portion of the
damages awarded.42 Startlingly, although champerty is a violation of the Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility,43 and state law, 44 a defense of champerty
in a Section 16(b) cause of action is not permitted.45
In a related sense, there also is an issue of solicitation in Section 16(b)
lawsuits. Attorneys who understand the lenient standing requirements may be
denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954).
39

Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 123 (1991).

40

See Gilson v. Chock Full O’Nuts Corp., 326 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1964), aff’d on
reh’g en banc, 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
41

BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 38 (4th ed. 1996). Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367, 369
(2d Cir. 1990) (“ absent fraud or overreaching, courts must enforce such private
contingency fee agreements, which are, after all, embodiments of the intentions and
wishes of the parties. . . .”).
42

See generally, 9 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 4286-89
(3d ed. 1992).
43

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(j) (1998). Contingent fees are an
exception to Rule 1.8(j). Id. Rule 1.8(j)(2). See generally Rule 1.5(c).
44

THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 391 & 19, 389 & 3 (3d ed.
1996) (citing CAL. CORP . CODE §§ 25000-25804 (West 1999)). “Most statutes are
based in whole or part upon the American Law Institute’s Uniform Securities Act.
UNIF. SECURITIES ACT , 7B U.L.A. 509-687 (1985 and Supp. 1988).
45

See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1956).
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inclined to solicit potential clients or, in the alternative, “create” clients to sue
for a Section 16(b) violation.46 Although solicitation in some respects has been
upheld by the Courts, such as in an advertising context,47 a question arises
whether it is appropriate in the context of Section 16(b).
Since Section 16(a) requires that an insider report any trades involving
his company’s stock to the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is a simple
project for a clerk to comb through these publicly accessible reports in order to
find a “violation.” Then the attorney can solicit “a plaintiff,” so that, in essence,
the attorney enforces Section 16(b) and receives sizable fees for his work.
The corporation actually pays this fee since it, in theory, has received a
“benefit” from attorney, i.e., the legal services that resulted in the recovery from
the insider who had no culpable intention. Of course, the net profits of the
corporation and the shareholders book value, are reduced by these fees.
Cases have held that the attorney is entitled to a “reasonable” fee for
the services rendered.48 The question is – is that fee justified for the amount of
the work done?
In a typical scenario, the attorney finds both a violation and a plaintiff,
and then writes a demand to the company for the enforcement of Section
16(b). If the insider returns the profit to the company without further legal
action, the attorney still is entitled to a substantial percentage of the recovery.
The plaintiff receives a minuscule amount in relation to the attorney fees
awarded. In one case, the individual plaintiff received only $1.10, and the bulk
46

Indeed, the plaintiff “shareholder” in several § 16(b) suits was the owner of the
newstand in the plaintiff’s attorney’s building lobby. One district court held
“unbelievable (his) own testimony that he had cash funds adequate to pay (fees)”
noting the lack of any bank accounts or sign of wealth . . . .” Blau v. Lamb, 314 F.2d
618, 619 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 813 (1963). See also Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (holding that “in-person solicitation for pecuniary
gain” does not warrant First Amendment protection as does advertising in the Bates
case, infra note 48); see also, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup.
Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (holding that a lawyer is free to place a newspaper
advertisement intended for luring a specific group of people as her clients).
47

Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that there can be no
restriction on truthful advertising and this restriction would be a violation of the First
Amendment).
48

See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1998) (for
determining “reasonableness”); see also Robert L. Wheeler, Inc. v. Scott, 777 P.2d
394, 395-96 (Okla. 1989) (basing an analysis of the “reasonableness” of attorney fees
on twelve discussed factors).
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of the award went to pay attorneys fees.49
This creates a “misincentive” for the attorney. Obviously there are
minor costs to search through Securities and Exchange Commission records
and find a violation, which should be compensated if there is a recovery for the
plaintiff and the corporation, but should it not be reasonable?
This scenario also perpetuates the public’s hostile view of attorneys.
Attorneys appear to have an excessive incentive to litigate merely for the fees
involved; not to right a true “wrong” or help a truly aggrieved plaintiff recover a
loss to which he may be entitled. The public perception of lawyers is already
extremely negative and surveys have shown a consistent dissatisfaction with
the legal profession as a whole.50 This Section 16(b) situation hurts the image
of attorneys and the legal profession in general. It is doubtful that this result
was envisioned by the drafters of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
C. Elements of the Lawsuit
Since the 1930's, the federal government has developed a framework
of criminal and civil laws designed to prevent corporate insiders from profiting
in the securities markets on the basis of nonpublic material information.51
Cases involving Section 16(b) have generally focused on the definition of
“sale” or “purchase,”52 the definition of a “security,”53 and what roles in a
corporation are considered “insider positions.”54 Regrettably, there have been
only a few cases on the identity of the plaintiff or the appropriateness of the
fees awarded to the attorneys.55
49

Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 847 (2d Cir. 1956).

50

See Barbara Rosen, Simple Things You Can Do Everyday to Improve Your Image,
PA. LAW, Jan. 1994, at 22.
51

15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).

52

See Taylor, supra note 26, at 1323-24. The process of starting a suit has a
shareholder of the issuer asking the issuer to require the insider to disgorge the
profits. Id. at 1324. If the issuer fails to do so within 60 days, then the shareholder
may file a suite to compel disgorgement. Id. at 1324-25.
53

See generally Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115 (1991).

54

See generally Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 33, at 38, 69-78.

55

See e.g., Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
1016 (1954); Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F.Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See generally
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative
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An initial reading of Section 16(b) leads a reader to believe that Section
16(b) should be an effective tool to deter insiders from trading on non-public
information. The most striking benefit is the fact that Section 16(b) does not
require any proof as to the intent of the purchaser/seller in successfully finding
a violation under Section 16(b). In other words, it is a strict liability statute.56
The only proof that the rule requires for a successful prosecution is that the
insider bought and sold corporate securities within a six-month (“short swing”)
period.57 Therefore, if an insider trades within the six-month period he is liable
no matter what his excuse for making the trades.
D. Let’s Stop Calling Them “Profits”
“Profit” calculations for insider trading are formulated so as to insure
that the highest amount of money will be disgorged from the insider. For
purposes of finding a violation under Section 16(b), it is irrelevant whether the
purchase precedes the sale or vice versa.58 As the Second Circuit stated, “the
only rule whereby all possible profits can surely be recovered is that of lower
price in, highest price out within six months.”59
However, no such definition of “profit” can be found in any other
accounting or economic theory. In essence, the statute allows recovery of
much more than the real, taxable gains made by the defendant. This is a
severely punitive result especially when the defendant had no scienter or
criminal culpability. Contrariwise, a defendant with criminal intent in a Rule
10b-5 case can be fined and “profits” are calculated in a traditional accounting
context.
To facilitate this maximum “profit” calculation, Section 16(b) does not
even combine all of the transactions within a six-month period to determine
whether an insider has a cumulative profit.60 Instead, it matches the absolute
Actions, 86 COLUM . L. REV. 669 (1986). See also Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389
F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1968), (citing Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.
1943)).
56

Wetzel, supra note 23, at 133.

57

Id.

58

See 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1994).

59

Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 239; see also Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir.
1951).
60

Taylor, supra note 26, at 1317.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol33/iss4/1

14

Dessent: Weapons to Fight Insider Trading

WEAPONS TO F IGHT INSIDER T RADING

2000]

lowest purchase prices with the actual highest sales prices to calculate the
moneys to be repaid. As a result, an insider61 could actually have a cumulative
loss during a given six-month trading period and still be required to pay
“profits” back to the corporation. The following example illustrates this point.
Assume that an insider enters into the following transactions:
1) Buys 100 shares on 1/2/00 @ $100/share
2) Buys 100 shares on 1/12/00 @ $70/share
3) Sells 100 shares on 1/21/00 @ $120/share
4) Sells 100 shares on 3/2/00 @ $75/share

5) Sells 100 shares on
3/3/00 @ $105/share
6) Buys 100 shares on
4/1/00 @ $110/share
7) Buys 100 shares on
4/3/00 @ $90/share
8) Sells 100 shares on
5/2/00 @ $150/share

When calculating the punitive damages owed in the above transactions,
the purchases and sales which produce the highest spread are put together,
notwithstanding whether the sale preceded the purchase or the purchase
preceded the sale. Therefore, the “profit” calculations of the insider’s
transactions are as follows:
Purchases
100 @ $ 70 (#2)
100 @ $ 90 (#7)
100 @ $100 (#1)
100 @ $110 (#6)

Sales
100 @ $150 (#8)
100 @ $120 (#3)
100 @ $105 (#5)
100 @ $ 75 (#4)

Profit
$8,000
$3,000
$ 500
$
0

Under this scenario, the statutory “profit” made by the insider during
these transactions is $11,500, whereas his actual, taxable and accounting
profit would be $8,000. This larger amount is what the insider is required to
repay under Section 16(b). This is a system which no longer needs to exist
when Section 10(b) allows a comprehensive look at culpability. The Smolowe
and Gratz cases were decided before Rule 10b-5 litigation developed. The
facts in these cases should turn on intent – not strict liability.
E. The Appropriate Role of § 16(a)

61

The effectiveness of Section 16(b) regarding a 10% beneficial owner is not as
concrete as the other statutory insiders. A beneficial owner may be liable under
Section 16(b) only if he owned more than 10% of the stock at the time of the purchase
and at the time of the sale. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418,
419 (1972).
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Section 16(a)62 provides for a thorough system to facilitate disclosures
of information regarding insider holdings and trades.63 This information
produces insight for the market as a whole and the regulatory authorities as to
appropriate conduct by insiders. Corporations and their counsel have
developed extensive training and counseling systems to admonish affected
persons of the illegality of insider trades and proper techniques under which
such trades may be made.64 Attendant publicity about those prosecuted for
such violations as well as a vigorous SEC enforcement division using Rule
10(b)565 give society adequate protection against these evils.
F. Omitted Defendants
Section 16(b) is underinclusive in that it does not include all employees
who may have valuable inside information and trade.66 A non-officer employee
or outside consultant to a corporation who makes a large, real accounting profit
within a six-month statutory period will not be required to disgorge profits under
Section 16(b).
Section 16(b) also is underinclusive with regard to the type of securities
that are applicable to Section 16(b). Section 16(b) only applies to insiders of
corporations whose equity securities are registered under Section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.67 The requirements of Section 12 mean that
those are large publicly held corporations. However, many companies are not
registered or not required to register under Section 12.68 Section 16(b) has no
application to these corporations and has no ability to discourage officers of
these entities from engaging in insider trading, a material weakness of the
62

15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994).
Section 16(a) provides that a person who is the beneficial owner of more than 10 per
centum of any class of equity security, or who is an officer or director of the issuer of
the security, must file a registration statement with the Commission within ten days
after they become a beneficial owner, officer, or director. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994).
63

64

Such cautionary memoranda also are required by the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 99 Stat. 1264.
65
17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1997).
66
Taylor, supra note 26, at 1323.
67

Section 12(b) requires registration when a security becomes listed on a national
securities exchange. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)
(1994). Section 12(g) requires registration when the issuer has more than $1,000,000
in assets and at least 500 shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1) (1994). But see 17
C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1997) (modifying Section 12(g)(1) to exempt from the registration
requirement any issuer with assets not exceeding $10,000,000).
68

Taylor, supra note 26, at 1323.
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statute. In short, the same conduct by the CEOs of two major corporations is
treated differently.
Another problem is the statutorily defined transaction period. Section
16(b) only applies to sales and purchases which both occur within a six-month
period.69 Congress apparently believed that the six-month period would
capture virtually all transactions in which there might be an opportunity to profit
from the use of inside information.70 However, despite Congress' belief, the
application of Section 16(b)'s statutory transaction period produces an
overinclusive effect. Since the period does not inquire into whether a trader, in
fact, used inside information, but instead sets an arbitrary time period during
which profits are prohibited,71 traders are prosecuted even if they do not trade
on inside information, so long as they traded within the six-month period.
Furthermore, Congress' reasons for creating the six-month period do
not seem to be relevant in today's markets. In 1934, six months was an
adequate time period with which to make sure that the inside information
became known to the general public. Today's extraordinary era of
instantaneous mass communication calls for a considerably shorter time
period. Furthermore, there is a large corps of market analysts who are vigilant
in their search for information about the companies which they follow. These
developments, together with SEC rules requiring companies to provide more
forward looking information,72 make it substantially more difficult to keep
information secret for extended periods of time. The statutorily defined period
is too long as it stands, and as such, poses a problem in its application.
G. Omitted Plaintiffs
The Securities and Exchange Commission has no authority to enforce §
16(b) as it does with other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.73 By only
allowing the corporation or individual shareholder plaintiff to sue, Congress
69

15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1994).

70

Taylor, supra note 26, at 1324 & n.35. (citing to the Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading,
Part II: Reform of Section 16, 42 BUS . LAW. 1087, 1130 (1987)).
71

Id. at 1323. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).

72

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-4 (West 1997)) and the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. Co. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 77p, 77bb (West 1997 and Supp. 1999)).
73

See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
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created enforcement through "private attorneys general."74 Now that § 10(b)
and its Rule 10(b)5 have been interpreted so broadly, it is time to place the
burden where it belongs: on the SEC.
Section 16(b) also is unlike other statutes in that the contemporaneous
ownership requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 does not apply.75 Fed. R. Civ. P.
23.1 states that, in a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders to
enforce the right of a corporation which has failed to enforce the right, the
complaint must be verified and allege “(1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or
a member at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains.”76 In a
Section 16(b) action all that is required is that the shareholder be an owner of
the security at the time he initiates the suit and maintain that status throughout
the pendency of the lawsuit.77
In reality, there are situations in which the corporation changes its
identity. For instance, in a case in which the defendant corporation merged
with another corporation during litigation, the question arose whether the
plaintiff shareholder still had standing to sue for the short swing transactions
done by those associated with the subsidiary.78
In that case, the Court interpreted the category of shareholders
involved in initiating a Section 16(b) suit, as those who have a “financial stake”
in the litigation. A stockholder of the issuer claimed that there were shares
traded in violation of Section 16(b). However, that corporation was acquired by
Viacom and the shareholder's stock in the issuer had been exchanged.79
The court held that the shareholder could maintain the suit even
though the company’s stock no longer existed since it was acquired by another

74

Coffee, supra note 55, at 669.

75

FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. A complaint by the shareholder against the corporation shall
allege that (1) plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction in
question; and (2) the action is not a “collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of
the United States which it would not otherwise have.” Id. Additionally, complaint shall
allege “with particularity” the reason(s) why the shareholder is taking action and
reasons(s) why she represents the interst of “similarly situated” shareholders or
members. Id.
76

Fed. R. Civ. Pro Rule 23.1 (West Group 1997).

77

Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco Indus., Inc., 607 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1979).

78

Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1991).
Id. at 118-19.

79
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corporation.80 The Court discussed Congress’ intent to put "a private-profit
motive behind the uncovering of this kind of leakage of information, [by making]
the stockholders [its] policemen,81 and quoted draftsman Thomas G. Corcoran,
while testifying before the House committee, who stated that Congress could be
confident that Section 16(b) would be enforced because the enactment of the
statute would "[say] to all of the stockholders of the company, 'you can recover
any of this profit for your own account, if you find out that any such
transactions are going on.’”82
The intent behind the provision that not only the corporation may
initiate a suit, but that a stockholder would be able to take action if the
corporation fails to do so, stems from the premise that if an officer, director or
more than ten percent shareholder chooses to violate Section 16(b), he must
be aware that someone with a profit motive will try to find out and initiate a
lawsuit.83 It appears that Congress, by granting standing of this considerable
magnitude, wanted to ensure that many possible plaintiffs would be able to
initiate a suit if needed, in order to deter insider trading of this sort.
In Gollust,84 the Court held that because the plaintiff received shares in
the parent corporation, he still maintained a financial interest in the outcome
even after the merger. The court concluded that any finding of wrongdoing by
the insider would force them to turn in profits to the new corporation. Thus, the
shareholder who now had an interest in the new corporation, would stand to
profit, albeit indirectly.85
This decision may limit the broad standing requirement by excluding
those who are security holders of an issuer involved in a cash-out merger.86
After a cash-out merger the shareholder no longer has a financial interest in
the outcome of the litigation, as required by the Gollust Court. Due to the fact
that the shareholder could not profit from the recoupment of the money, he

80

Id. at 129.

81

Id. at 124-25; (citing Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 136 (1934)
(testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran)).
82

Id. at 125 & n.7.

83

Gollust, 501 U.S. at 125 & n.7.

84

501 U.S. 115 (1991), aff’g, 909 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1990).

85

See id. at 112.

86

See Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 33, at 41.
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should be denied standing.87
IV. BALANCING T HE SCALES – ARE T HERE STILL MEANINGFUL “BENEFITS”

TO §

16(B)?

While it is the position of this paper that there are major problems
associated with Section 16(b) and its enforcement, it seems also that the points
initially thought of as benefits to preventing insider trading can also be
considered problems. For example, while the concept that a shareholder's
attorney can be awarded his fees under Section 16(b) sounds beneficial
because it may help encourage a reluctant shareholder to bring a Section
16(b) suit against an insider, such fees steer the focus away from preventing
real culpable insider trading, and promote unethical dealings between client
and lawyer.
Second, while strict liability seems like a benefit if insiders are deterred
from engaging in insider trading because of the ease with which they may be
found to be in violation of Section 16(b), the Act only includes the statutorily
defined insiders and on a higher level corporate leaders and applies even if
the defendant did not trade on insider information.
V. THE CAMEL UNDER T HE T ENT: UNFORSEEN RESULTS OF SECTION 16(B)
A. The Setting: How Fees are Set:
There are several proper methods for attorneys to obtain fees for their
legal services, the major ones being through a fee agreement or retainer or on
a contingent fee basis. A retainer is the advancement of payment to an
attorney for his legal services. Contingency fees are based on the premise
that the client will pay the attorney a percentage of the recovery if the outcome
is successful. Such an agreement includes the work done by the attorney, but
does not usually cover the out-of-pocket cost of litigation, for example court
costs and discovery expenses. The client remains ultimately liable for these
expenses. The overlap with champerty, the practice where the attorney seeks
to recover his fee for legal services and the expenses he incurred by
advancing the cost of the law suit himself, are clear.
An attorney’s fee may be contingent on the outcome of a matter for
which his service is rendered, except in a matter for which a contingent fee is
prohibited, such as criminal and domestic cases.88 A contingent fee agreement
must be in writing and state the method by which the fee is to be determined,
87

See id. at 42.

88

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106, EC 2-20 (1981); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (d) (1998).
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including the percentage that will be paid to the lawyer in the event of a
settlement, trial or appeal. Other expenses are to be added from the
recovery.89 Contingent fee agreements are permitted in the civil context.
However, the advancement of expenses is precluded in many jurisdictions.90
Under traditional rules, the company pays the plaintiff's attorney's fees
when the attorney confers a benefit on it in the form of the recovery of profits
from the insider.91 It is considered a windfall for the corporation.92 In one case,
the corporation recovered nothing, but still had to pay the attorney’s fees, even
though no benefit was conferred upon it.93
There are generally two ways to calculate the attorney's fees. The first
is the "lodestar method," which compensates the attorney at his or her hourly
rate, based on the time expended on the action.94 This method of
compensation has the drawback of encouraging the attorney to work more
leisurely, thus running up the fee. Also, if there are disputes regarding the
hourly rate of billing, the court will essentially have to determine whether the
rate is fair and whether the time spent on the matter is reasonable, which uses
up already scarce judicial resources.95 Another drawback is that if the attorney
spends enough time to find the violation and a plaintiff merely sends a demand
letter prompting the insider to pay the profits without further action by the
attorney, his hourly rate may not compensate for his time and effort. (The time
the attorney spends searching for a security law violation is not attributable to
the company that receives the benefit.)96 This takes away the incentive for the
attorney to monitor Section 16(b) violations, which is not what Congress had in
89

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (c) (1998).

90

See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Free Riders and the Greedy Gadfly: Examining Aspects
of Shareholder Litigation as an Exercise in Integrating Ethical Regulation and Laws of
General Applicability, 73 MINN. L. REV. 425, 443 (1988).
91

See Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 149 (3d Cir. 1978).

92

See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943).

93

See id. See also Gilson v. Chock Full O’Nuts Corp., 326 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir.
1964).
94

See e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated after remand 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.
1976). Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540
F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976).
95
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff As Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 38.
96

See id.
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mind when it wrote Section 16(b).97 However, this method may be more fair to
the corporation, especially if the amount of legal work is not substantial.
Another method of compensating attorneys for their efforts is to award
them a percentage of the corporation’s recovery.98 Often, there is a recovery
for the corporation, and the attorneys receive a large fee award, often for a
minimal amount of work.99 This is partially due to the way the statute is
designed, since if all of the elements are met, there is generally no defense
and the insider will have to turn over the profits.100
The individual plaintiff and other shareholders usually receive a
minimum benefit in relation to the amount of the attorney fees.101 While this
has the effect of encouraging attorneys to monitor and enforce Section 16(b)
violations, which is what Congress had in mind to police and deter insider
trading,102 the downside is that it encourages the attorneys to seek out a
violation and find a plaintiff merely for the fees involved.103 This results in
overenforcement and opportunism by attorneys, which creates a negative
image of the legal profession in the mind of the public.
B. The Dilemma – Crossing The Line
Due to the relaxed standing requirement of Section 16(b), it has
become a widespread practice of attorneys to either solicit shareholders of the
corporation in which the short swing transaction occurred or to ask friends or
family to purchase securities of the corporation in order to obtain standing and
have the attorney provide their legal services. This rule creates an impetus for
attorneys to pursue private enforcement of the securities law.104
There is an incentive for the attorney to prosecute suits that may not be
meritorious or may be of little value to the shareholder or the company, simply

97

See generally Coffee, supra note 55, at 677-98.

98

See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 (1984).

99

See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d. Cir. 1943).

100

See generally Coffee, supra note 55 at 677-98.
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See Smowlowe, 136 F.2d at 241.
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to stimulate attorney fees.105 In many of these cases, the attorney's financial
incentive is the sole motivation for enforcement of Section 16(b).
The attorney basically becomes an entrepreneur or a "bounty
hunter,"106 not just an enforcer for an aggrieved or injured client or a deterrent
to illegal conduct.107 This situation allows a chance of opportunism and
overenforcement on the part of the attorney.108 The attorney generally has a
low search cost in relation to the amount of money that he or she can make
from these cases.109 There is no defense to a violation, which basically makes
this an ideal situation for the attorney. All the attorney must do is find a
violation and a plaintiff, prove the elements of Section 16(b), and he has a fee.
One could argue that if the attorney does not have a motive (a
substantial fee) to search out violations and enforce them on behalf of a client,
who will do so? Since most potential plaintiffs own stocks through mutual
funds, where they probably don't even know the names of the individual stocks,
they will not take action to enforce Section 16(b).110 It is likely that most small
105

In Portnoy, a United States District Court, stressed the need for the attorney's role
before recovery of fees. The corporation already had begun an investigation into an
alleged §16(b) violation by the time that the plaintiff shareholder's letter notifying the
corporation of the possible short swing transactions arrived. Id. at 566-67. The court
noted that the corporation had informed the shareholder that it was pursuing the claim
and waiting for a determination on the exact amount to be recovered. Id. at 566.
However, after the sixty-day waiting period had expired the shareholder brought a
derivative action to recover the illegal short swing profit. Id. at 567.
A few days later, the corporation notified the shareholder that it had secured
the profits and settled the matter. Id. Thereafter the attorney for the shareholder
requested the court to award him attorney's fees in prosecuting the action. Portnoy,
711 F. Supp. at 567. The court denied his claim, stating that "an award is equitable
only if the attorney's services were a substantial or motivating factor in the
corporation's recovery in the illegal profit," and in this case he was not because the
corporation had informed the shareholder that it was pursuing the alleged violation. Id.
at 569.
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See 15 U.S.C. §78u-1(e) (1994). For SEC procedures relating to bounty hunter
provisions, see 17 C.F.R. §§201.61-201.68 (1997).
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investors have no idea that they can bring action against the insider. Even if
the small investor were aware, it is unlikely he would have the time, interest, or
sophistication to do so. This is especially so considering the small monetary
benefit to the individual shareholder.111 Shareholders with a substantial
interest in a company rarely try to enforce Section 16(b).112 If the corporation,
which is more than likely aware of the trades involved, does not care to take
action against the insider, no one is left to do so.113
However, new federal legislation allowing private causes of action for
contemporaneous trader involving insider trading provide a clear consistent
framework for enforcement in this field. The major problem of Section 16(b) or
following Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 is solved as well. Champerty is eliminated. The
defendant must have scienter, and the SEC or individual plaintiff is allowed to
recover if a violation of Rule 10(b)5 is proven. Thus, Section 16(b) has
essentially become moot, or at worst, much more of a problem than a solution.
VI. THE POOR PLAINTIFF
A. Where’s the Money?
Since attorneys receive large amounts for their fees and the
shareholder who is supposed to be the one with an interest in the litigation
usually does not really increase his personal equity, is the purpose of this act
being accomplished?.
The extreme disallocation of any proceeds can be extraordinary. In
one case the attorney was awarded $3,000 for fees and $78.98 for expenses
to be paid by the corporation.114 The recovery against the defendants was
$18,894.85.115 The plaintiffs were only benefitted by about $3 since they
owned only 150 shares out of 800,000.116
In another case, the plaintiff shareholder sought to increase his
personal equity by $1.10 if the Section 16(b) action was successful,117 while if
111

See generally id.

112

See Magida, 231 F.2d at 847.
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See id. at 848.
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Smowlowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d. Cir. 1943).
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Id. at 240.

116

Id.

117

Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d. 843, 847 (2d Cir. 1956).
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he were unsuccessful he would be responsible for costs and expenses adding
up to many hundred times that amount.118 Subsequently, in a later action the
attorney petitioned the court for an allowance of 50 percent of the recovery.119
The court noted that the services rendered by the attorney were both
necessary and beneficial to the corporation; however, it was found that this
amount was excessive. As a result, the court granted an allowance of $12,000,
approximately one quarter of the total amount recovered, which it felt was fair
and adequate to cover his services.120
It was argued that this would be unfair considering the discrepancy
between what the attorney received as a benefit versus what the actual plaintiff
received. However, in the Court’s reasoning it stated that the corporate issuer
is the one who usually brings forth the action and only upon its refusal or delay
does the shareholder have the right to act.121 The Court reasoned that a
stockholder who is successful in maintaining a Section 16(b) action was entitled
to reasonable attorneys' fees because it was the corporation which had
received the benefit of the attorney’s work and, therefore, should pay for such
a benefit.122 Since the corporation is the one which has received the benefit, it
must pay for the services.
An arguable question which arises is what is the purpose of having a
shareholder plaintiff? The only ones really benefitting are the corporation and
the private attorney who worked on the case when the corporation failed to do
so. In some cases the attorney is the only one who benefits because, while the
corporation may receive the proceeds of the short swing profit due to the work
of the attorney, it also has to pay out large sums for attorney's fees and costs.
For example, in one case a court granted the attorneys $750,000 in
fees but the amount recovered was $7,920,000.123 Originally, the attorneys
petitioned for $2,500,000; however, the court found this to be unreasonable. It
decided that the notion that a fee based primarily on a percentage of the
recovery exceeded the limits of reasonable compensation for the attorney's

118

Id.

119

Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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Id. at 783.
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Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 332 F.Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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efforts.124
It seems as though whether you are a bonafide shareholder or a friend
who has bought into the action, the court is not interested. As long as the
corporation receives a benefit from the attorney’s work, the theory is that every
shareholder receives a benefit. An example of this is where a case settles
before going to trial and the attorney cannot even account for all of his time
spent on the case.125
When the issue of avoiding trial has arisen, the courts have been willing
to award more than one third the amount of recovery in attorney's fees simply
because the case settled.126 One court awarded $10,000 in fees to attorneys
in relation to work done on the case, even though they could not show the
actual amount of time spent.127 The court based its reasoning on the fact that
the fees were reasonable and fair, based on the results achieved by the
intervention of counsel.128
Also, under circumstances when the attorney has merely aided in the
discovery of short swing profits, attorney's fees have been awarded. In Gilson
v. Chock Full O’Nuts Corporation,129 the Second Circuit allowed an award to an
attorney who had merely brought the violation of Section 16(b) to the attention
of the corporation, who later brought suit.130 The case was appealed from the
United States District Court which dismissed the complaint for attorney’s fees.
The Court of Appeals cited Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, which recognized
that reimbursement of attorney's fees was required by equitable
considerations.131
One of the problems with identifying champertous agreements is the
question of whose interest is being pursued. For example, when an attorney
enters into a contingent fee agreement the attorney is highly motivated
124

Id. at 163.

125

See id. at 164.
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Blau v. Kagan, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 92, 119, at 96,561 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 8,
1968).
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Id.
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326 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1964), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
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Id. at 248.
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personally to win the case and receive a share of the judgment. If the client has
paid the costs, the attorney maintains the client's interest in pursuing the case,
so that he may profit only from judgment, but not be motivated to prosecute the
action solely to obtain his fee.
Technically in a champertous agreement, the attorney puts his interest
first because he has more at stake. Not only is the attorney trying to win the
case to receive his share for the work that he has performed, but he needs to
recoup the money that he has put out for costs. Therefore, the shareholder
becomes the vehicle through which the attorney initiates the case and recovers
fees.
In this latter arrangement, the shareholder is no longer relevant after
the case has begun, because the needs which the attorney seeks to address
are his own. This practice is held to be unethical.132 The rules relating to ethics
state that an attorney shall not acquire a proprietary interest in a cause of
action or litigation.133 It has been argued that the attorney has put himself in a
position of primary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the
litigation that he is conducting for the client, when he has based his fee on the
success of the case.
In addressing this issue the courts have balanced the interests of the
corporation's many shareholders versus the self-seeking attorney. The Court
in Magida v Continental Can Company stated,
Presumably Congress is aware of the opportunity presented to
attorneys to suits for their benefit, but apparently it regards
public policy against proved and repeated violations of
fiduciary responsibility by corporate offices at the expense of
the public more detrimental to public good than the violation of
generally accepted ethics by attorneys.134
Thereby, it set the standard that champertous agreements would not be a
defense to Section 16(b) actions, but, if proven, would only be pertinent to the
determination of the amount of the award granted to the attorney. Since courts
are willing to award attorney's fees even in cases where counsel has acted
unethically,135 it is possible to see how attorneys may take great steps to
132

See generally Gabaldon, supra note 88, at 466-69.

133

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.8(j) (1998); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(A) (1981).
134

Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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become involved in Section 16(b) actions. After all, even if they act
inappropriately, their actions are not a defense to the action. Further, the only
harm they may suffer is a reduction in the amount of fees they receive.
Tragically, the issue of impropriety becomes irrelevant.
B. Solicitation
One key problem with Section 16(b) is that solicitation of legal
representation by an attorney from existing holders of securities violates longstanding established principles.136 The rules on professional responsibility
state that a lawyer shall not, except in some permitted forms of advertising,
recommend employment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or
associate to a layperson who has not sought his advice regarding the
employment of a lawyer.137
When this issue has arisen, the judicial attitude has been that the ends
of Section 16(b) enforcement justify means that may involve technical
improprieties. In fact, courts have uniformly held that an attorney's solicitational
acts may be grounds for disciplinary action, but will not suffice as a defense for
a Section 16(b) action.138
Thus, attorneys who read a report filed with the SEC may try to solicit
those who own shares of the corporation to initiate an action, since it is the
attorney who receives a fair share of the recovery. Attorneys may even ask
friends, family or employees to buy shares, thus giving them standing, and the
attorney employment on the case.
In Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Incorporated,139 the court stated the policy
for such a conclusion
We do not suggest that counsel fees should be automatically
awarded to overzealous attorneys; nor do we want lawyers
poring over Section 16(a) reports as soon as they are made
public to find a cause of action before the corporation does
and thereby collect a fee. Reimbursement for information
leading to corporate recovery will be allowed only if the
corporation has done nothing for a substantial period of time
after the suspect transactions and tis inaction is likely to

136

See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1981).
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continue. In this way, it is not speed but careful investigation
which will be rewarded, and the corporation will have adequate
opportunity to enforce its rights without prodding from a
stockholder. But if the corporation has been, and is likely to be,
inattentive to its rights, a portion of any recovery should
properly go to the stockholder for reimbursement of any
reasonable legal expenses.140
Another issue is that of soliciting an intimidated or co-conspirator
employee, family member or friend to buy into the action. While a lawyer may
be considered to have an attorney/client relationship with a close friend or
relative resulting merely from advice given, it is unlikely that “advice,” in this
context, includes asking a friend or family member to buy into a cause of
action. This type of solicitation usually translates into the attorney acquiring an
interest in the litigation, since it is not the friend or relative who has any interest
in the outcome of the action. The attorney is the only one who really stands to
benefit by receiving his fees.
VII. PROPOSALS F OR CHANGE
It is argued that repeal is needed n
i this area of securities law
enforcement for three reasons. First, proper theories exist to meet Congress’
intent. Second, society needs to curb the excessive and unnecessary litigation
that is rampant in this area of the law. Third, the bench and bar should help to
restore the badly tarnished image of attorneys and the legal profession. In
order to cause changes in this area of the law, it is necessary to examine the
circumstances that make it possible for attorneys to indulge in unnecessary
litigation merely to collect fees. These circumstances involve the issue of
standing of the plaintiff.
The standing requirements of Section 16(b) are quite broad in relating
to securities laws. This is evident by the fact that a person can obtain standing
by acquiring the stock after the alleged trade has taken place, and such a
person does not need to own any certain amount of shares to initiate the suit.
One share of stock is enough to confer standing.141
Further, Section 16(b) states that "any security" will be adequate to
confer standing.142 Examples of such securities include stocks, notes,

140

Id. at 473.
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warrants, bonds, debentures, puts, calls and others.143 The only restriction is
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has
a maturity at the time of the issuance not exceeding nine months.144 Due to the
ease with which a person can become a party to the suit, amending the law
may be the only alternative to cure the ongoing abuse by plaintiff’s attorneys.
There are several theories with which to amend Section 16(b). They
include: (1) eliminating private causes of action, (2) banning contingent fees, or
(3) changing the category of possible plaintiffs by requiring them to be
shareholders at the time of the trade. In the alternative, the decision in United
States v. O'Hagan145 may set the standard, thus repudiating the need for
Section 16(b) at all.
A. Eliminate Private Causes of Action?
Under Section 16(b) a shareholder may initiate a suit for insider trading
sixty days after notifying the corporation, if the corporation fails to act. By
virtue of this rule, all the shareholder has to do is wait the sixty days and then
initiate his suit to recover the short swing profits. Attorneys, as discussed in the
section above, use this time to investigate and research, all of which may lead
to the discovery of a violation of Section 16(b). They are compensated for all
work done, which facilitates the recovery of short swing profits.
In the best scenario to justify the lawyer’s role, the corporation fails to
act within the sixty-day period and the attorney initiates the law suit, increasing
the amount of compensation he receives for the return of profits by the insider
proprietary figure. If an insider is taking advantage of his position and making
illegal trades, why not allow the interested shareholder to seek him out and
make him divulge any profits made?
While in theory this sounds ideal, reality is that the shareholder is
usually not the one with real interest in retrieving those profits. It is the
attorneys who facilitate the suit. They are the ones who profit from the initiation
of a law suit. By eliminating private causes of action, attorneys would not be
able to take advantage of the lenient standing requirement. There would be no
involvement of private attorneys for the sake of retrieving short swing profits.
143

THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 408 & n.1 (3d ed. 1996)
(stating that “[t]he registration requirement [of securities] is set forth in section 12(g),
15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (1994).”). See generally Donald A. Scott, Checklist for Registration
of Securities under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25 BUS .
LAW. 1631 (1981).
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While this approach may seem unfair, many other securities laws give
the enforcement of such laws to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Section 16(b) is one law which Congress chose not to give such authority.
Since 16(b) requires the shareholder to notify the corporation first, Congress
may have thought that the issue would be settled internally by the corporation.
The fact that it allowed the shareholder to take action sixty days after notifying
the corporation may have been to simply put a threat on the corporation.
In many of the cases, when the corporation fails to take action within
time allotted, and the shareholder initiates a suit, the case settles before
litigation.146 This may be a reflection of what was intended, a quick resolution if
the corporation failed to act on its own. The notion of plaintiff attorney's fees
was never even considered by Congress. There is no mention in Section 16(b)
of attorney's fees.
The courts have developed their own standard for determining what are
reasonable attorney's fees. Had Congress known how widespread this practice
of receiving attorney's fees for private causes of action, it may have granted
the SEC the power to enforce Section 16(b) violations.
Another possibility is for Congress to allow the Securities and Exchange
Commission to enforce Section 16(b), instead of private plaintiffs. There are
two ways that this could be accomplished. The first method would be to simply
allow the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce Section 16(b)
instead of private plaintiffs. If violations were pursued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission only, instead of private plaintiffs, there would be no
attorney fees to be collected. A flat percentage of the recovery, such as twenty
percent, could be paid out of the recovery to the Securities and Exchange
Commission to fund the enforcement. This would leave the corporation with the
majority of the recovery, although that fee may not cover the actual cost of
recovery by the Securities and Exchange Commission. This would eliminate
the lucrative plaintiff's bar that has developed in this area. The Securities and
Exchange Commission would be as aggressively motivated in seeking out
violations as would a private attorney with a monetary incentive. It also has the
financial resources to do so.
Thus, the solution may lie in vesting the power to enforce Section 16(b)
146

See DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL, 265 (6th ed. 1998)
(stating that usually, a favored defense tactic to obtain a dismissal of derivative actions
is to create a committee of “disinterested” directors. If, when this committee decides
that it is not in the “best interest of the corporation” to maintain this action brought
forth by a shareholder, it asks the court to dismiss the action. Therefore, in many
cases settlement results before litigation occurs.)
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violations in the SEC. By allowing the SEC to be the enforcer of such
violations, the shareholder would not have the burden of paying the costs of
the suit in cases where the corporation has failed to act. Furthermore, the SEC
would not have a personal stake in the outcome of the case. This may insure
an unbiased representation of the shareholder in retrieving short swing profits.
Lastly, this is another alternative which may cure ongoing abuse by attorneys.
B. Allow Champerty as a Complete Defense?
To allow a complete defense of champerty would defeat the purpose
and intent of Congress in effectuating the enforcement of Section 16(b). Even
though an individual plaintiff would not receive a large increase in the value of
his or her stock and the attorney would receive a significant amount, to allow
otherwise would control the enforcement of Section 16(b).
If Congress were to apply Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 or Section 10(b)
contemporaneous trade standard, so the plaintiff must be the owner of any
security of the issuer at the time of the alleged insider trading and at the time
that the suit is instituted, it would solve a major weakness in the statute. This
would make finding a willing plaintiff more difficult since the number of possible
plaintiffs is limited to only those who had a genuine interest in the company,
which would cut down on the number of Section 16(b) actions undertaken.
Also, this would reduce the number of actions that were pursued only for the
interest of the attorney who found the violation, as it would require more work
on the part of the attorney to find a willing plaintiff.
In conclusion, if Section 16(b) were amended to grant the SEC the task
of enforcing Section 16(b) insider trading rather than private parties, this could
well cure the problem of overzealous attorneys.
Attorney’s fees would still provide the main stimulus for enforcing
Section 16(b), but it would now require the attorney to find a "real” plaintiff, not
one who purchased the stock after the short swing trading merely in order to
benefit him or herself. This would provide a balance between the opposing
interests involved. The attorney still has the opportunity to generate fees by
pursuing Section 16(b) violations, but this will further the intent of Congress in
encouraging private enforcement. The prosecution of Section 16(b) may drop
slightly, but the ones not pursued would be the type of actions to be
discouraged. There will still be a large recovery for the attorney, but he or she
will have to travel further to reach it.
C. Change the Standing Tests?
Another requirement under Section 16(b) is that the plaintiff must be
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the "owner of any security."147 The term "any" share has been found to mean
at least one share.148 Other cases have held that there is no restriction on the
number of shares, the percentage of shares, or the value of the share(s).149
This results in potential plaintiffs with a very minimal interest in a company, who
have the power to enforce Section 16(b).150 The requirement of allowing a
plaintiff standing who only owns a negligible number of shares seems
unreasonable. To require more shares or a larger percentage of shares would
still allow small shareholders who are truly aggrieved to enforce Section 16(b).
The problem of how many shares remains. However, the current requirements
for standing creates a situation that may be exploited to the detriment of the
legal profession. The standing requirement of a minimal number of shares
combined with the requirement that the plaintiff need only have an interest at
the time the suit is instituted, has resulted in a situation where attorneys can
seek out a violation, find a plaintiff to buy a single share, and enforce Section
16(b) solely to earn a fee.
D. Modify Section 16(b) to include Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1?
A possible solution to cure the problem of attorney solicitation of
current shareholders and friends or family who purchase shares to obtain
standing, may be to require the shareholder to own their shares at the time of
the alleged inside trade. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 states that, in a derivative action
brought by one or more shareholders to enforce the right of a corporation who
has failed to enforce the right, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege
"(1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or a member at the time of the
transaction of which the plaintiff complains."151
Modifying Section 16(b) to include Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 could prevent
the fabricated cases which arise with overzealous attorneys. If the statute
required contemporaneous ownership then, only those stockholders who had
shares in the corporation at the time of the alleged trade would have standing,
thus reducing the number who would have standing.
This would eliminate the practice of attorneys soliciting friends or family
to buy into these actions. Shareholders who purchase shares of the
corporation after the alleged trade has taken place would not be able to bring
147
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suit on behalf of themselves and the other shareholders.
Denying an after-the-fact shareholder the right to sue because he was
not a shareholder at the time the trade appeared does not contradict the policy
behind Section 16(b), which was designed to allow legitimate plaintiffs to initiate
a suit for the good of the corporation as a whole. The corporation thus
remains the primary beneficiary of the disgorged funds.
Thus, requiring plaintiffs to be shareholders at the time of the trade
appears to be the solution to attorney impropriety.
E. Eliminate Certain Types of Attorneys’ Fees?
Section 16(b) does not specifically provide for the granting of attorney’s
fees. Courts have held that fees are justified in the majority of cases, for
several reasons; first, fee awards may be the sole stimulus for the enforcement
of Section 16,152 and second, if the corporation receives a recovery, a benefit
has been conferred on it,153 and it should pay the reasonable value of the
services that resulted in the recovery.
This leaves the amount of the fees as the major issue. In Gilson v.
Chock Full O'Nuts, the court held that "equitable considerations require the
corporation to pay a reasonable attorney's fee.”154 In Smolowe, the court found
that "since in many cases such as this the possibility of recovering attorney's
fees will provide the sole stimulus for the enforcement of Section 16(b), the
allowance must not be too niggardly."155 It appears that the attorney fees
should be particular to each specific case, since the work required for each
one may differ as far as effort, difficulty, and time expended. It would be unfair
to deny an attorney payment for his services that conferred a benefit on
another.
This would chill the enforcement of Section 16(b). However, the fees
should be reasonable (in other words, not excessive) in light of the
circumstances of each particular case. Shareholders generally do not have
the money to institute the suit. Attorneys have become the force behind the
initiating and pursuing of these suits. In cases where attorneys have asked a
friend or co-worker to buy shares to obtain standing, it would be unlikely for
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Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing Smolowe v.
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their attorney to then ask for a retainer to pursue the case that they created in
the first place.
Another solution to the problem of attorney interest may be to eliminate
contingent fee arrangements. If a shareholder wished to investigate a possible
Section 16(b) violation, he would have to obtain the services of an attorney
through a retainer agreement. This would eliminate the solicitation by attorneys
who ask friends to purchase shares to secure standing, since those who
purchased the shares to allow the attorney to pursue the case would not be
willing to pay for the suit.
This would eliminate abuses by attorneys who have a self-interest in
Section 16(b) actions, but not affect those shareholders who honestly want to
initiate a suit based upon a Section 16(b) violation. In this circumstance, the
shareholder who has discovered a possible short swing trade would still be
able to pursue the case.
Moreover, the court has the final determination on whether to award
attorney's fees. In most cases, only where the attorney's work has been a
motivating factor in the recovery of profits and where their work has
substantially benefitted the corporation will the court award attorney's fees,
thereby placing conditions on whether to grant fees for the work performed.
The court also has in its discretion the power to reduce the amount of
the fees sought by the attorney who litigated the action.156 In cases where a
compromise has been reached as to the amount the insider will furnish to the
corporation, the parties can stipulate to the dismissal of the action and
attorney's fees. Although this amount is not binding on the court, the court
may ask the SEC for an opinion on the appropriateness of the award
requested.
Ordinarily, the SEC makes a recommendation as to how much it
believes the attorney should receive in fees. In some cases the court does not
follow either proposal. For example, in Blau v. Brown & Western Nuclear,
Incorporated,157 the parties stipulated to an amount of $11,250 for attorney's
fees.158 The SEC recommended $3,800 or ten percent of the recovery and the
court awarded $7,500.159 In another case, the parties agreed to $3,000 in
attorney’s fees.160 While the SEC suggested $1,000, the court awarded
156

See generally Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 332 F.Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 92,263, at 97,253 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1968).
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$1,800, twenty percent of the recovery.161
This area presents difficulty because a set formula would be unfair to
some attorneys, and a percentage of the recovery would be unfair to a
corporation for what little legal work was done. The matter of fees is individual
to each case and they are often excessive, but the solution is for courts to use
an increasing percentage of the recovery based on the time and the difficulty
of its collection. The court would have to determine what a reasonable plaintiff
in the field of securities litigation would pay an attorney on an hourly basis and
estimate the reasonable number of hours that an experienced attorney would
need to complete the recovery.
The reasonable hourly rate would be calculated based on the
geographical area, skill, difficulty of the work and factors as those found in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. This option has several drawbacks.
First, the court would be put in the position of monitoring the current market
rate for attorney fees, which would take up judicial time. Theoretically, the
required reasonableness of the fees based on the amount of the work actually
done should reduce the number of attorneys who pursue a Section 16(b)
violation simply to run up excessive fees. This may reduce the incentive for
private enforcement of these violations, but if there were truly an un-addressed
violation, an attorney would still be able to be paid at his usual hourly rate, as
long as it was reasonable.
It seems arguable whether the courts have truly balanced the windfall to
plaintiff’s attorneys versus the small recovery for the shareholder. One theory
concerning the contingent fees is that only cases are brought which have
merit.162 Attorneys will assess the chance of the suit’s success before
instituting the suit, based on the premise that in the event that it is not
successful, they will not be paid. However, the reoccurring danger exists of
whose interests are being pursued.
The courts have effectively addressed this issue and placed the value
of recovery in Section 16(b) cases higher than the self-interested attorney. It is
not to say that the impropriety of plaintiff’s attorneys does not exist, but the
courts have decided that the inherent goal of Congress in enacting Section
16(b) for the good of the public outweighs all else.

160

Blau v. Berkey Photo, Inc., Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 92,264, at 97,255 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 4, 1968).
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Id. at ¶ 97,256.
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However, the elimination of contingent fee arrangements would not
disregard Congressional intent. Section 16(b)'s silence on the matter of
attorney's fees, leads to the conclusion that Congress may have thought that
since the law was written bestowing strict liability on those who violate it, there
would not be much litigation. They may have thought that if the insider did not
turn over any profit made within the six-month period, the corporation would
ensure that the profit was disgorged. However, because attorneys' fees are not
mentioned in the statute, leads to an argument that they should not be
awarded.
F. Eliminate Section 16(b) Altogether?
Section 16(b) has been criticized for several reasons.163 The first is
that it only applies to a defined group of directors, officers, and beneficial
owners.164 Section 16(b) does not apply to others within the company who may
have access to valuable information. It also applies to the defined group, who
may not even have access to information, but may still be penalized for trades
not motivated by inside information.
Second, Section 16(b) applies only to insiders of equity securities
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.165 It does not apply
to insiders of corporations that are not required to register, even though those
insiders may engage in short swing trading.166 Another criticism of Section
16(b) is that it does not require an insider to use inside information, but only
considers whether the trades were within a six-month period and whether a
profit may be calculated. Actually, this discourages insiders from owning
securities issued by their company.167 Contrariwise, it does not affect trades
that are outside the six-month window, even if they were motivated by inside
information.168
One possible solution is to eliminate Section 16(b). There are other
sources169 which prohibit the use of inside information in securities trading,
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See Taylor, supra note 26, at 1318-19.
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See id. at 1322-26. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
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most of which are more efficient and fair to both the insiders and the trading
public.
Two of these are Section l0(b) and Rule 10(b)5.170 Section l0(b) is a
general fraud provision, which in conjunction with Rule 10(b)5 prohibits the use
of material inside information when trading securities, until that inside
information has been made available to the public.
These provisions apply to all interstate securities sales and purchases,
regardless of the time frame, and not just to corporations that are required to
register under the Securities Act of 1933.171
An insider violates Section l0b-5 if he trades in the securities issued by
his company on the basis of material information that is not available to the
public.172 This section applies not just to traditional insiders such as officers
and directors, but to people who may have access to inside information by
having an indirect connection with the company, such as attorneys,
accountants, and others who are temporarily connected with the corporation.173
These people are considered
fiduciaries.174
In order to be found in violation of Rule 10(b)5, an insider must have
been in a fiduciary relationship with corporation.175 Until recently, this meant
that the person had to have a relationship with the company or the
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Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that, "It shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails, or any facility of any national
securities exchange -- to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on the securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 15
U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
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shareholders, thus establishing the duty.176
In 1980, the Supreme Court found that a printer, who traded on
nonpublic information gained in conjunction with his employment, had no
fiduciary relationship that required him to disclose information.177
In 1997 the Supreme Court decided the case of United States v.
O'Hagan.178 There, an associate in a law firm, retained to represent a
company in an acquisition, became aware that a major tender offer was
forthcoming. The associate purchased options in the securities in the
corporation he acquired and made a substantial profit. The associate was
convicted on multiple counts of securities fraud, mail fraud, and money
laundering. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed because it found that
the associate had no relation to the corporation and, therefore, had no duty to
it. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that even though the associate
had no duty to the corporation, he still had a duty to his law firm, even though it
had resigned from the case before the offers were conducted.179
This 'misappropriation’ theory holds that a person commits fraud ‘in
connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates Section 10(b)
and Rule l0b-5 when he misappropriates confidential information for securities
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. In
lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between a company insider
and purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory
premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who
entrusted him with access to confidential information.180
By comparison, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 concentrate on singular
securities, while Section 16(b) focuses on controlling a particular class of
transactions.
The Court also noted that an insider who secretly converts the
principal's information for personal gain, defrauds the principal. Further, the
next requirement that needs to be proven, that the trade was “in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security,” is satisfied when without disclosure to
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the principal, the insider uses the information to purchase or sell securities.181
Even more noteworthy, is that the holding includes not only officers, directors,
and other permanent insiders of the corporation, but also attorneys,
accountants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of the
corporation.182
In the Section 16(b) situation, where an insider uses information he
obtained due to his position and profits, he is deemed to have defrauded the
corporation because there was a certain relationship of trust and confidence
between the shareholders of the corporation and the insider. Therefore, the
corporation, as well as the investing public, are harmed by his actions. It is this
reason that the 1934 Congress enacted Section 16(b) in the first place, to try
to preserve this sense of trust. When the insider uses this information to
purchase or sell securities without informing the corporation, (including all
shareholders) the second element is met, that of "in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security."
In essence, the Rule 10(b)5 statute now is held to condemn (1) using of
any deceptive device, (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
in contravention of rules prescribed by the Commission.183
The
misappropriation theory permits the imposition of liability to a person who
trades in securities for their personal benefit.184 By using material, confidential
information without first disclosing it to the public, the insider breaches the duty
of loyalty and confidentiality, he owes to the principal.185
With United States v. O’Hagan,186 the Court may have declared the
final word on all insider trading. There may no longer be a need for two
standards. All inside traders can be dealt with under the misappropriation
theory. The Court held that criminal liability under Section 10(b) may be
predicated on the misappropriation theory.
Thus, the advantage of using Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)5 to control
insider trading makes it easier to focus on the facts of an individual situation,
rather than finding a whole class of securities trades improper. This would allow
181

Id. at 656.
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the plaintiff (or the Securities and Exchange Commission) to determine whether
the trades were actually motivated by inside information. This has the
advantage of allowing short swing trading by insiders when the trades are not
motivated by inside information, but on personal financial situations, such as
family situations, other investment opportunities, or unexpected bills, etc.
These sections also have the advantage of not being applicable only to public
corporation or statutorily defined insiders, since the laws are applicable to more
trades which would advance Congress' intent in reducing insider trading.
One disadvantage of using Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)5 to combat
short swing insider trading is that it is more difficult to prove liability, which, in
turn, makes for more expensive and time consuming litigation, thereby using up
already strained judicial resources. Another drawback is that Rule 10(b)5 does
not impose liability for trading on inside information unless there is a breach of
fiduciary duty. This requirement would make it more difficult to prosecute short
swing insider trading, but it is possible that the statute could be changed
slightly to accommodate this.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Insider trading continues to be an issue today. Those insiders who
transact in short sales and who do not divulge their profits to the corporation
are sought out and forced to return the profits. Whether it is a shareholder of
the corporation who initiates the suit or an overzealous attorney who finds out
about the trade and encourages a friend to purchase the security to obtain
standing, one thing is clear, the insider will forfeit the profits if he violates
Section 16(b).187
Section 16(b)188 permits litigation merely for the sake of attorneys’ fees,
and it may not be as effective as other statutes in deterring and monitoring
insider trading. While it is clear that this area of the law needs to be changed,
the question of exactly how to change it without defeating the intent of
Congress regarding the enforcement is a difficult one.
One key method of controlling excessive litigation would be to allow the
Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce Section 16(b),189 which would
remove the incentive for attorneys to aggressively pursue violations.
Another method would be to eliminate Section 16(b)190 entirely and use
other statutes already in place to control short swing insider trading.
187
188
189
190

15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
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Amending Section 16(b)191 to eliminate private causes of action,
contingent fees or adding the contemporaneous ownership requirement of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1192 to this section may also help. It has been argued that
allowing the SEC to initiate suits where the corporation has failed to, may be a
solution which would solve many of the existing problems. The SEC could
pursue these suits, thereby eliminating the reward of large sums of the
returned profits to the attorney. In the alternative, O'Hagan193 may become the
standard in cases dealing with insider trading.
Whatever the final result may be, there continues to be an ongoing
problem of attorney impropriety in relation to Section 16(b) actions. If the intent
of the Congress was to restore the integrity of the stock market and eliminate
insider trading, then the O'Hagan194 decision may be the best solution.
This paper has examined the statutory section of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b),195 and attorney impropriety, an unforeseen
issue which arose due to the relaxed standing requirements. The courts have
weighed this problem with the overall purpose of Section 16(b) and found in
favor of public policy. The reward to attorneys who do the job that should have
been done by the corporation is too large a price to pay for the “benefit”
conferred on the corporation and its shareholders.
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Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
See supra notes 177-184 and accompanying text.
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15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) 1994.
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